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Abstract
In this paper I examine the concept of "vulnerability" within the context of income
mobility of the poor. While the concept of poverty is well developed, the concept of
vulnerability is less established in the economic literature. I test for the dynamics of
vulnerable households in the UK using Waves 1 - 12 of the British Household Panel
Survey and nd that, of three di¤erent types of risks for which I test, household-specic
shocks and economy-wide aggregate shocks have the greatest impact on consumption, in
comparison to shocks to the income stream. I nd vulnerable households up to at least
10 percentile points above the poverty line. Savings and earnings from a second job are
not signicantly associated with smoothing consumption of all vulnerable households.
The results strongly indicate that income transfers and benets assist the vulnerable in
smoothing consumption. Thus, traditional poverty alleviating policies are not likely to
assist the vulnerable.
JEL codes: I3, I32, I38.
keywords : income variability, vulnerability, poverty, insurances.
1 Introduction
In recent policy discussions, the importance of identifying the vulnerable has risen con-
siderably. While newspapers and policy reports clearly distinguish between those who
are "poor" and "vulnerable", these concepts are not fully separate in their treatment in
the economic literature. For instance, in the aftermath of the summer 2011 riots in the
United Kingdom, discussions in the mass media frequently focussed on the uncertainties
of those who are poor and "near-poor", as well as which policy measures ought to be im-
plemented to prevent the near-poor from succumbing to the e¤ects of the current global
economic crisis.1 Similar discussions of economic insecurity and unemployment have also
occupied newspapers in the United States, much of the Euro-Zone, and even less a¤ected
emerging markets such as China, Singapore, India, Brazil and Argentina. The global
economic crisis increased world unemployment from 178 million in 2007 to 206 million
in 2012 (ILO (2012)), bringing economic insecurity to the forefront of policy discussions
worldwide.
While a well dened poverty line exists by which researchers and policy makers alike
can count the number of the poor2, there is no agreed denition on how to count the
"vulnerable" or the "near-poor" in the economic literature. In this paper I will highlight
who are the UKs "vulnerable" and distinguish them from the "poor" using the British
Household Panel Survey. I use the British Household Panel Survey as it provides a
continuous panel of householdsconsumption and income streams, alongside an array of
household level characteristics and of their access to several credit and asset variables.
The idea of the vulnerable as being distinct from the poor is not new. That precar-
iousness is welfare reducing, even if one is not currently poor, has occupied social and
economic literature for decades, if not for over a century. Frederich Engels described
Victorian England: "True, it is only individuals who starve, but what security has the
working-man that it may not be his turn to-morrow? .... He knows that every breeze that
blows, every whim of his employer, every bad turn of trade may hurl him back into the
erce whirlpool from which he has temporarily saved himself, and in which it is hard and
often impossible to keep his head above water. He knows that, though he may have the
means of living to-day, it is very uncertain whether he shall to-morrow."(Engels (1845),
page 26).
1The investigation commissioned by the UK government to understand the causes of the riots in
August 2011 was summarised in the report of the (Communities and Panel" 2012) : "There are peo-
ple bumping along the bottom, unable to change their lives".. "individuals were under considerable
(economic) stress", and public action is required to help "500,000 forgotten families" in the UK. A key
recommendation of the report was to make families more "economically resilient". Interviews with 270
rioters, undertaken by The Guardian newspaper and the London School of Economics, suggested income
inequality, poverty, joblessness, economic insecurity and lack of hope for the future as some of the factors
which fuelled the riots (Newsnight, BBC2, 2011)
2The discussion of a poverty index dates to the 1960s (see Sen (1976) for an account of the development
of the poverty index) and continues to be ne-tuned as in Deaton (2010) and Chen and Ravallion (2010).
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Over a century later, understanding vulnerability has occupied recent economic liter-
ature, (Townsend (1994), Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), Amin et al. (2003), Dercon and
Krishnan (2002), to name a few) whereby the vulnerable are identied by modelling the
role of risks and uncertainty that impinge upon the households consumption stream. In
this paper I adopt an empirical denition of vulnerability: vulnerability is observed if an
income shock or idiosyncratic shock translates into a shock to the consumption stream
(as is also adopted in several of the aforementioned papers, described in Section 2). I
identify the vulnerable in the UK with the British Household Panel Survey, using a panel
regression approach, and with a particular interest in observing the e¤ects of smoothing
mechanisms, or "insurances" that may be at their disposal.
In particular, I use Feasible Generalised Least Squares to estimate signicant vul-
nerability in the presence of smoothing mechanisms. These smoothing mechansisms are
household characteristics (like household size, presence of an earning member in house-
hold), and access to savings and earnings from an extra job, amongst many others, and
via having transfers and benets captured in the following income concepts used: gross
and net, monthly and annual. All three income concepts reveal di¤erent vulnerability
dynamics, particularly close to the poverty line. I handle potential endogeneity in the
model by extracting residuals from Mincer regressions (of income on years in education
and age) to use as an instrument for income.
In order to identify the households that are vulnerable, I split the income distribution
into several quantiles on the basis of several denitions, and identify location-specic
vulnerability3. The signicance of the smoothing mechanisms are observed to be di¤erent
at di¤erent parts of the income distribution and over di¤erent time-horizons. These
ndings are new to the literature, where location-specic dynamics are not estimated in
any of the earlier literature.
Where are the vulnerable? The location-specic dynamics reveal that they are not
just below the poverty line (as one would expect), but also above the poverty line. Results
in the paper show that there are vulnerable households up to at least 10 percentile points
above the poverty line. Vulnerable households are also mobile: they move in and out
of poverty. Also, idiosyncratic shocks appear to be equally evident in impacting upon
consumption changes along with income shocks. All in all, the vulnerability dynamics
revealed are not quite the same as one would obtain when performing similar analyses for
a "determinants of poverty" study. This suggests that the policy package to be devised
by the policy maker to assist the vulnerable is likely to be di¤erent than one for poverty
alleviation.
3In that respect, the work is close in spirit to that of income mobility (Shorrocks (1978), Jenkins
(2011)). While the mobility literature focuses on the mechanisms that drives households both up and
down along the income distribution, in this case I am more interested in those who are downwardly
mobile. Another important point of departure from the mobility literature is that it rests on theories of
risk and uncertainty.
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I build and contribute to the literature that already exists on identifying the vulner-
able, where they identify risks which make households vulnerable. A large part of the
extant work (particularly in the Development Economics literature) devotes itself to iden-
tifying the nature of the shocks which a¤ect householdsconsumption stream and welfare,
in particular with reference to Asia and Africa, using household level datasets (Amin et al.
(2003), Dercon and Krishnan (2002) Maloney and Bosch (2004), Lokshin and Ravallion
(2000)). The e¤ect of income shocks on the consumption stream has already received
substantial econometric treatment, particularly under a macro-econometric framework.
These studies use inter-temporal choice models based on some variant of the permanent
income hypothesis that investigates the presence, or absence, of consumption smoothing.
Studies include those which measure the extent of consumption inequality (Blundell et al.
(2008), Blundell and Preston (1998), Deaton and Paxson (1994)) as well as more direct
tests of the presence of consumption smoothing in the face of income shocks (Japelli
and Pistaferri (2006), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004)). These studies rene the economet-
ric tools to track income shocks on consumption, but are not fashioned to identify the
location of the vulnerable in an income distribution.
While the extant studies employ a large variety of empirical methods and risk mod-
elling frameworks, there is no unied consensus on the identication of the vulnerable
with the intent to provide policy prescriptions. I do not propose new empirical approaches
but rather focus on identifying location-specic dynamics of the vulnerable and their re-
sponses to the smoothing mechanisms that are available to them. The three types of
income concepts (i.e. monthly gross and net, and annual net) that are available in the
BHPS have made it possible to identify the role of government welfare transfers and bene-
ts that allow households to smooth consumption. These results have strong implications
for policy. That the results reveal that savings and extra income from a second job have
relatively little smoothing e¤ect compared to that of the e¤ect of transfers and benets
is signicant for policy makers.
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 sets up the empirical methodology for the
identication of the vulnerable. Section 3 describes the data and the variables used for
the analysis. Sections 4 and 5 present the results, Section 6 discusses the results and
Section 7 concludes.
2 Background: Who are the vulnerable?
While there are several approaches to measuring vulnerability, how it is best measured
and implemented is not fully agreed upon by researchers. There are several empirical
approaches that have been undertaken to activate the idea of vulnerability. Much of its
recent application, particularly in developing countries, stems from Townsends (1994)
framework. The paper addresses the e¢ cacy of risk-sharing mechanisms in a full insurance
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framework. Townsend (1994) and several other empirical papers (Mace (1991), Cochrane
(1991) were all based on a complete market structure as in the Arrow-Debreu model (1959,
64), much of which reject the complete market hypothesis. Mace (1991) studies individual
consumption in the US and nds that growth and changes in the level of consumption
is determined by the average consumption. Both Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991) test
for possible idiosyncratic, uninsured components that may impact upon levels or growth
in consumption. In both cases, household incomes matter. Cochrane (1991) reveals that
food consumption growth rates are lower for households that have experienced illness and
job layo¤s. In the developing country literature, Dercon and Krishnan (2002) also test
the perfect risk-sharing model for Ethiopian households, and investigate public transfers
via food-aid as risk-sharing arrangements. Here too the authors investigate idiosyncratic
income shocks to test for testing risk-sharing where food aid to the village individuals
functions as a "positive" income shock. They too nd little evidence of perfect risk-
sharing.
Ligon et. al. (2003) propose a di¤erent approach to measuring vulnerability which
allows them to quantify the welfare loss associated with poverty as well as the loss as-
sociated with di¤erent sources of uncertainty, applied to Bulgarian panel data. Their
measure can be decomposed into into distinct measures of poverty, aggregate risk, and
idiosyncratic risk. With this approach they decompose the e¤ects of each of these fac-
tors on levels of welfare - elimination of risks would only reduce welfare by 3%, whereas
elimination of poverty would improve welfare by 14%. The e¤ect observed via elimina-
tion of idiosyncratic shocks is insignicant compared to the size of the e¤ect in reducing
poverty and aggregate risk. Chaudhuri et al. 2002 and Pritchett et al (2001) use a mea-
sure of household vulnerability measured by the expected head count measure of poverty.
Vulnerability as uninsured exposure to risk provides an alternative ex post assessment
of welfare loss arising from the onset of an economic shock (Glewwe and Hall (1998) ,
Maloney and Bosch (2004) and Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) all use this approach).
The approach used in this paper is in the spirit of macro models that incorporate
the impact of risks on consumption (Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991) Meghir and Pistaferri
(2004), Japelli and Pistaferri (2006), Blundell and Preston (1998)). The Townsend (1994)
approach, which uses constant absolute risk aversion preferences, led to several developing
country studies where the risks which mattered the most tend to be idiosyncratic in
nature alongside the economy-wide shocks, such as ination (Amin et al. 2003, Dercon
and Krishnan 2002). Some of these studies have explicitly focused on the size of the
e¤ects of an income shock on the expected welfare of the household (Chaudhuri et al.
2002, Ligon and Schechter 2003). In short, in this study vulnerability is observed if a
signicant shock (an income shock, or idiosyncratic shock) is translated into a signicant
change in consumption. The empirical model estimated in this paper is therefore distinct
from poverty-dynamics models that focus primarily on the mobility of the poor in terms
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of entry and exit rates, and on the identication of factors that trigger such transitions
(Bane and Ellwood 1986, Jenkins 2000).
2.1 The empirical strategy for measuring vulnerability.
The empirical approach in this paper is to use a panel regression based on the approach
used in Dercon and Krishnan (2002) and in spirit to that of Cochrane (1991) and Mace
(1991) to identify the impact of risks and "insurances" that are available to households.
I will identify the shocks which characterise income risks, by inclusion of a number of
household characteristics and year-specic dummies which will capture idiosyncratic and
economy-wide shocks. To identify location-specic dynamics of the vulnerable in the
income distribution, I will split the income distribution into a number of quantiles, on
the basis of a number of denitions on the same lines as introduced in Bandyopadhyay and
Cowell (2007)4. Focusing on quantile specic dynamics will reveal vulnerable households
near the poverty line. Finally, I will include a number of "smoothing mechanisms", which
I loosely call "insurances", to observe their e¤ects on the vulnerability dynamics. All the
variables that are used in the analysis are discussed in the following data section.
3 The British Household Panel Survey
The BHPS extends for 18 waves and follows the same representative sample of individuals
over a period of 18 years from 1991 to 2008. Each annual interview round is called a wave:
in our study I use the rst 12 waves of data, and each wave is principally household-
based, interviewing every adult member of sampled households. I work with 12 waves to
maximise the complete availability of all the income (gross and net) and socio-economic
variables that are used in the paper. Each wave consists of over 5,500 households and
over 10,000 individuals drawn from 250 areas of Great Britain. The samples of 1,500
households in each of Scotland and Wales were added to the main sample in 1999, and
in 2001 a sample of 2,000 households was added in Northern Ireland.
Our principal variables of interest are those of consumption, income, and household
characteristics.
The following variables have been used for the analysis:
4This paper builds upon the structure that is introduced in Bandyopadhyay and Cowell (2007) (here-
after BC) for identifying the location of the vulnerable. Whilst in the earlier paper the focus is on
identifying who the vulnerable are in the distribution of income, this paper takes it further and identies
the vulnerable in light of the insurances that are at the behest of these individuals/households. The
papers di¤er in their conclusions: whilst BC identies the vulnerable in the income distribution, the
current paper does so for the conditional income distribution, with reference to the insurances available
to the household. The results are therefore, unsurprisingly, di¤erent. I nd factors which mattered in
determining who the vulnerable are in BC are often not so important in nding the vulnerable using a
conditioned income distribution.
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 Expenditure on food, per week per household.
 Household income, per household
 Number of children in household.
 Household size (i.e. number of individuals present in the household).
 Number of household members of employable age.
 Savings of household, monthly
 Earnings from a second job, monthly
 Tenured job, or not.
Expenditure on durables is only available for one wave, hence cannot be included in
the analysis. The dataset has a complete panel with 1,510 individuals per wave.
Some of the variables have had to be constructed given the nature of the variables
provided by the BHPS. Household consumption is only available for food consumption
(with very sparse data on fuel consumption). Household expenditure per week per house-
hold is multiplied by 4 to obtain monthly food consumption, and divided by household
size to obtain per capita estimates. Income variables are dened in three di¤erent ways,
detailed in Bardasi and Jenkins (2004). These are monthly gross income, and two net
income denitions annual and weekly. Net annual income is provided over di¤erent
time periods; for our study I have chosen income over the period 01.01.year to 31.12.year.
Details of the derivation of net incomes in Bardasi and Jenkins (2004) is provided in
the Appendix. The three di¤erent denitions of income give us di¤erent perspectives
on the income smoothing process while the monthly per capita income allows for all
the time-specic shocks, the net current income takes into account the household weekly
income net of the local taxes, while net annual income does the same over the period of
12 months (net of taxes and annual pension contributions) and allows for some income
smoothing to have taken place. The relative importance of each time horizon will reveal
itself with the estimations, discussed in the results later.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the variables I will be using for the estima-
tion of vulnerability dynamics, estimated at 2000 prices. What is interesting to observe
is that the dynamics of level values of consumption and income vary signicantly from
the inter-temporal changes of the same variable. The main aim of the empirical analysis
will be to identify the associations of the changes in consumption in response to changes
in income. The second half of the table presents the summary statistics of the truncated
sample. The truncations are performed on the basis of outliers of the changes in household
consumption - I truncate households for which changes in inter-temporal consumption
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variable name abbreviation
real monthly expenditure, per capita rxpmnpc
gross monthly income y_gross
net monthly income y_net
net annual income y_net_ann
ln y_gross dlygross
ln y_net dlynet
ln y_net_ann dlynetann
household size hhsize
number of children in household nkids
number of earning members in household nwage
savings per month saved
earnings from second job j2pay
whether job is tenured or not tenured
dummy for wave n dwaven
Table 1: Variables and abbreviations
full sample truncated sample
N = 16610 N = 16211
variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
realxpmnpc 91.6 42.57 0 600 91.70 41.71 10.00 600.00
y_gross 601.19 438.92 0 21997.38 601.46 439.02 0 21997.38
y_net 675.35 757.29 -50.42 22946.89 670.11 753.97 -50.42 22946.89
y_net_ann 8834.83 9414.53 0 295634.3 8765.48 9376.60 0 295634.30
dlygross 0.05 0.38 -6.81 4.27 0.05 0.38 -6.81 4.27
dlynet 0.04 1.08 -9.62 9.78 0.04 1.08 -9.62 9.78
dlynetann 3.61 1.58 -5.83 13.26 3.61 1.58 -5.83 13.26
hhsize 2.60 1.43 1 10 2.62 1.43 1 10
nkids 0.74 1.10 0 6 0.75 1.10 0 6
nwage 1.09 1.15 0 6 1.09 1.15 0 6
saved 63.44 219.49 0 8500.0 63.60 220.03 0 8500.0
j2pay 19.04 157.50 0 9000.0 18.80 156.54 0 9000.0
tenured 0.69 0.46 0 1 0.69 0.46 0 1
Table 2: Summary statistics
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exceed +/-1. It is clear from the right-hand side of the table that truncation does not
remove the most extreme values of any variables other than dlxpmnpc, the variable used
to condition the truncation.
3.1 The cross-section unit of study
The BHPS matches persons across waves and not households, thus presenting itself as
a possible di¢ culty for using the data as a longitudinal panel. This, however, is sur-
mountable in that one can match households by the personal identity numbers. Again,
tracking individuals as opposed to just households is our preferred cross-section unit, as
household compositions change over the waves (due to a household member leaving the
household, or due to the interviewee not being available while survey was being under-
taken)5. Our unit of consumption and income is that of the person, having taken into
account household compositions. In tracking individual consumption and income I am
also avoiding possible problems with economies of scale with large households. This how-
ever is dealt with when using equivalised quantities (results are available with author and
not presented in paper for reasons of brevity).
4 Vulnerability - initial glimpses
Our rst set of estimates involve estimating the following model:
 ln cit =  ln yit + tWt + "it (1)
where ct := Ct=n, denotes individual consumption (per-capita consumption of the house-
hold) in wave t, yit is individual income (household income per capita) in wave t, and Wt
is a wave dummy, which equals one for observations at wave t, zero otherwise. t varies
from 1 to 12, wave 1 corresponds to t = 1, and wave 12 corresponds to t = 12.
In addition to the wave dummies which capture year-specic aggregate shocks, I
include household characteristics which may be signicant determinants of household
vulnerability dynamics. Variations in household size and composition may be seen as
idiosyncratic shocks which have a direct impact upon the welfare of households. So I
augment (1) as follows:
 ln cit =  ln yit + tWt +Xit + "it (2)
5As noted in the BHPS, longitudinal and cross sectional weighting is recommended for the samples
that were added on for the later releases of BHPS data, as areas of Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland
were over represented in the sample. Going by the documentation provided by the BHPS, at the following
link, https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps/faqs/weights, no weighting was required to have been applied
for the waves used in the study.
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where Xit is a vector of characteristics for individual i in wave t. While this model tests
for a particular specication of the utility function (namely, the CRRA specication)6, it
empirically also lends itself better to the statistical problems which medium-to-long run
time series data present. Di¤erencing renders the variables as stationary, thus preventing
any spurious co-trending from accounting for a positive and signicant smoothing co-
e¢ cient.
Finally to take into account the e¤ects of possible insurances that may be at the
behest of the households, I include a number of insurance variables. These are considered
as variables that are likely to "condition" the relationship between  ln cit and  ln yit:
 ln cit =  ln yit + tWt +Xit +Git + "it (3)
where Git is the vector of insurances for individual i in wave t. These variables
are savings, (lagged by one period, and by two periods to avoid e¤ects of endogeneity),
earnings from a second job, whether the household has access to credit, whether it already
has a loan (indicative of its ability to have access to credit from banks), whether the
individual has a mortgage, value of property owned, and whether the person owns credit
cards.
I assume the error term to be uncorrelated with the RHS variables and to have zero
mean. Let us also assume the following dynamic structure:
var ("it) = 
2
i (4)
cov ("it; "jt) = 0
cov ("it; "it0) = 0
The error term can be expected to vary across individuals, because of heterogeneity
in household size, consumption and income. The heteroscedasticity of the error term
assumption is motivated by tests performed such as the White test (by regressing the
square of the residuals on household characteristics and their squares and cross-products
for each wave), where some heteroscedasticity is revealed. We estimate (3) taking into
account the heteroscedastic nature of the error term using standard Feasible Generalised
Least Squares (FGLS). 2i in equation 4 is given as:
2i = exp
 X
j
jzij
!
(5)
where the zij are observables such as household size, number of children.
6The CRRA specication, or the constant relative risk aversion specication of the utility function
assumes the approach of the individual towards risk - absolute or relative. The CARA (constant absolute
risk aversion) and the CRRA specication are the two most popularly used utility function specications
that are used in this literature.
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Several diagnostic tests performed on the residuals using standard panel data meth-
ods (i.e. allowing for a homoscedastic error term) do not suggest a strong presence of
heteroscedasticity; nevertheless I use FGLS methods for estimation along with standard
panel regression methods. Taking inter-temporal di¤erences (i.e. of the regressand and
principal regressor, cit and yit) eliminates a source of correlation across time periods
and there is little evidence of correlation of the di¤erences across time periods.7 The
GLS method used takes into account any residual correlation across panels that may still
remain after the rst-di¤erencing. Equation (3) is estimated both under FGLS and the
standard panel regression techniques.
I have run the above models using both FGLS, and standard xed and random e¤ects
panel regressions with all these insurance variables. Barring savings and earnings from
second job, none of the other insurance variables are signicant in the estimated models. I
therefore only present results from the regressions including these two insurance variables.
4.1 Insurance variables and endogeneity.
To observe the e¤ect of the insurances that are available to households, I may encounter
some endogeneity due to the close relationship between age, education, income and saving.
Including these variables separately as explanatory variables in equation 3 increases the
possibility of further endogeneity due to the strong correlations between these variables.
I rst, therefore, take into account the e¤ects of age and education on the levels (and
variation) of income. For this, I will model what are known commonly in the literature
as Mincer regressions8, and extract the e¤ect of age and education on income, and use
the residuals from these regressions as an instrument for income.
This method has two benets. One, is to be able to extract the e¤ects of age and
education on income and use that component of income that is free from the e¤ects of
age and education. Second, on further including the insurance variables, such as savings,
or access to credit, a further source of endogeneity is also dealt with here.
I run the following Mincer regression model to account for the variation in income
that is governed by factors other than age and education:
ln yit = 1 + 2ageit + 3age
2
it + 3ageit  schoolit + 4schoolit + eit (6)
7The correlation coe¢ cients between cit and cit 1; and yit and yit 1 are not signicant any-
where nor do I obtain a consistently signicant Dickey-Fuller statistic.
8I thank Frank Cowell for this suggestion. The Mincer regressions popularly used by the Labour Eco-
nomics literature derives from Mincers 1974 seminal work, Schooling, Experience and Earnings, where
earnings is regressed upon education and experience, to obtain an age-experience prole. The Mincer
equations success pins upon the fact that inspite of its parsimonious specication, it ts remarkably well
in most contexts.
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where, I estimate school as
schoolit = 3  highest qualication achievedit + 5 (7)
where "highest qualication achieved" is a scaling I propose based on the following:
 5: Higher degree
 4: Degree
 3: A level/HND, HNC
 2: CSE/O level
 1: No academic qualications.
yit is income (monthly gross, monthly net and net annual) for individual i in wave t,
eit is assumed to be an error term normally distributed, N(0; 2e):I now instrument income
with the residuals from the regression 6 for the estimation of equation 3. Residuals are
extracted for all three income types. To avoid similar issues of endogeneity, I lag the
variable savings 9. Earnings from second job is documented in the BHPS questionnaire
as earnings in the week prior to the current week, therefore not requiring any further
lagging. I observe that of all the "insurances" that have been included as regressors,
only lagged savings is robustly associated with changes in consumption. To account for
the length of the memory of income, I have also run a few specications to observe the
e¤ect of lagged income di¤erences, for which I have obtained the same dynamics as that of
contemporaneous income rst di¤erences10. For each of the models that I have estimated,
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic does not suggest in any of the models that the use of
standard panel methods would have been inconsistent (the F statistic is not signicant in
any of the models estimated). Likewise the Anderson LM test and Sargan tests for over-
identication also do not result in a signicant test statistic to suggest over-identication
in any of the models estimated.
In the following section I will focus on the vulnerability dynamics specic to the
location of households in the income distribution in light of these insurance variables.
9I was also motivated to use lagged values because of obtaining insignicant results with the current
time periods savings as a regressor. It is intuitive that last periods savings are more inuential in
deciding current periods expenditures.
10Results are obtainable from author on request and are not included here for reasons of brevity.
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5 Locating the vulnerable in the income distribution
I am particularly interested in the location of the vulnerable in the income distribution.
This is important as not all cases where an individuals or households current consump-
tion is responsive to current income should be characterised as vulnerability. Richer
agents respond to surprise positive income shocks by boosting their consumption, this is
not to be characterised as "vulnerability". Likewise, the poor already under the poverty
line are also not "vulnerable" in the sense we wish to dene here, even though one may
obtain a strong association between volatile incomes and volatile consumption for these
households/quantiles. In other words, one can be both poor and "vulnerable" by the
empirical denition set out earlier, but we are more interested in those who are not in
poverty now but likely to slip into it.
To identify the dynamics in the neighbourhood of the poverty line and to compare
dynamics in specic parts of the distribution I adopt the following procedure11. Specify
a set of intervals:
Ij := [qj; qj+1)
where 0  qj < qj+1 < 1 and let them dene a set of location-specic subsamples on
which to estimate the model (3) using one of two methods. First, consider the households
starting positions in the income distribution according to whether they fall into interval
Ij by rank in the initial wave, Second, identify households that at some point in time have
contact with Ij. Tables 3 to 5 presents results of the rst method for xed quantile groups
throughout the income distribution; Table 6 and 7 compares the results for each of the
two methods to examine the performance of the vulnerability model in the neighbourhood
of the poverty line where the neighbourhood intervals Ij are determined relative to the
poverty line12.
I rst observe the distribution specic dynamics by observing the vulnerability dy-
namics at di¤erent parts of the income distribution. For this, I take the following xed
quantile groups as key starter intervals: 20-40%, 40-50%, 50-60%, 60-70% and 70-80%
where, for example the 20-40% group includes all households who start at or above the
20th centile, but below the 40th centile. Tables 3 to 5 present results across the di¤erent
quantile groups using the FGLS specication using three di¤erent income denitions:
gross monthly, net monthly and net annual income. Two important observations are
clear: rst, that the vulnerability dynamics are clearly quantile-specic. The vulnerabil-
11This method is also used in Bandyopadhyay and Cowell (2007)
12Given that we are observing vulnerability in light of insurances available to the individual, it is
important for us to recognise that initial conditions with regard to these insurances may be functional
in determining the vulnerability dynamics. For example, prior exposure to poverty may mean that
savings may have little e¤ect on the vulnerability dynamics. This e¤ect however is aptly captured by
the treatment of endogeneity using the Mincer equations. I thank an anonymous referee for this insight.
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ity dynamics di¤er across the income distribution. Second, the vulnerability dynamics
are also sensitive to the denition of income. While there is some signicant vulnerability
for the gross income denitions for a number of quantiles (namely 50-60th and 60-70th),
these are not so apparent in the net income denitions. For the net monthly income
model, I obtain signicant vulnerability for the 20-40th and 60-70th percentile, while for
net annual, only for the 60-70th percentile.
In short, that the net income denitions yield little signicant vulnerability are sugges-
tive that net incomes (which are incomes net of the transfers and benets for this sample)
are successful in smoothing consumption. This highlights the importance of benets and
transfers for the vulnerable. We will return to the crucial policy implications of this
nding later on.
Of the two insurance variables, I do not observe a great deal of signicant association
of these with changes in consumption13. Lagged savings is not signicant for any income
denition. Earnings from a second job is signicant for some of the specications for all
the monthly gross and net income types for the top three quantiles, but with a very small
co-e¢ cient. Of the household characteristics, I observe neither of the number of children
and number of wage employable members in the family to be signicantly associated with
changes in consumption.
To summarise, signicant vulnerability is particularly specic to the location in the
income distribution, and is also sensitive to the income denition.
It is also important to observe the temporal nature of vulnerability. For both monthly
(gross and net) income denitions, I observe some signicant vulnerability. However, for
net annual income, I do not observe any signicant vulnerability for any of the quantiles.
This suggests that vulnerability is likely a short-term phenomenon.14
Location in the income distribution determined in a static manner, as above, has
highlighted only some instances of vulnerability. The task therefore now is to implement
a dynamic denition of location in the income distribution, pursued in the following
section.
5.1 Dynamics around the poverty line
I now focus on the vulnerability dynamics in the immediate neighbourhood of the poverty
line. To identify these dynamics I need to dene 1) a poverty line, 2) what denes
13For savings and second job pay variables, since these are income variables, I have taken natural
logarithms.
14I have further explored the temporal nature of vulnerability by splitting income into its transitory
and permanent components. When the above models are estimated with the transitory component of
the income, the vulnerability dynamics are again clearly exhibited. These results were presented in a
previous version of the paper, and are available from the author on request.
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Ij : 20-40% 40-50% 50-60% 60-70% 70-80% 80-100%
drygross 0.015 0.001 0.057y 0.057y -0.002 -0.002
dwave2 0.075 0.134 0.088y 0.097 0.099 0.099
dwave3 0.043 0.002 0.013 0.069y 0.052y 0.052y
dwave4 0.049z 0.010 0.048 0.060z 0.024 0.024
dwave5 0.045 0.016 0.024 0.041 0.010 0.010
dwave6 0.056y 0.021 -0.010 0.044 0.042z 0.042z
dwave7 0.000 0.075y 0.083y 0.070y 0.024 0.024
dwave8 0.065y 0.052 0.122 0.10 0.093 0.093
dwave9 0.009 -0.005 -0.044 0.045 -0.002 -0.002
dwave10 0.033 0.029 0.039 0.023 -0.023 -0.023
dwave11 0.067y 0.007 0.010 0.046 0.056y 0.056y
nkids 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003
nwage -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006
tenured -0.011 0.002 0.011 0.008 -0.012 -0.012
lagsaved 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
lagj2pay 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000z 0.000z
cons 0.003 0.014 0.000 -0.015 0.026 0.026
Anderson LM p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 0.871 0.783 0.634 0.657 0.711 0.976
Notes : Signicant at the 1% level
y: Signicant at the 5% level
z: Signicant at the 10% level
Table 3: Vulnerability dynamics, selected quantiles for monthly gross per capita income
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Ij : 20-40% 40-50% 50-60% 60-70% 70-80% 80-100%
drynet 0.014 0.003 0.007 0.024z -0.006 0.005
dwave2 0.082 0.091y 0.103 0.092 0.098y 0.102
dwave3 0.067y 0.048 0.064 0.068z 0.071 0.035
dwave4 -0.013 0.054 0.060 0.062 0.068 0.023
dwave5 0.049 0.047 0.059 0.064 0.082y 0.015
dwave6 0.032 0.045 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.010
dwave7 0.021 0.039 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.054
dwave8 0.066y 0.080y 0.101 0.113 0.129 0.130
dwave9 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.016 -0.021 -0.055
dwave10 -0.011 0.039 0.046 0.056 0.063 0.016
dwave11 0.036 0.023 0.050 0.042 0.061 0.042
nkids 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002
nwage -0.006 -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.006
tenured 0.005 -0.009 -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 0.008
lagsaved 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
lagj2pay 0.000 0.000y 0.000 0.000z 0.000z 0.000z
cons 0.018 0.018 -0.007 -0.006 -0.018 0.002
Anderson LM p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 0.715 0.673 0.563 0.675 0.671 0.982
Notes : Signicant at the 1% level
y: Signicant at the 5% level
z: Signicant at the 10% level
Table 4: Vulnerability dynamics, selected quantiles for monthly net per capita income
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Ij : 20-40% 40-50% 50-60% 60-70% 70-80% 80-100%
drynetann 0.003 0.002 -0.008 -0.012z -0.001 0.001
dwave2 0.093 0.104 0.097y 0.082y 0.106 0.107
dwave3 0.045 0.004 0.051 0.073y 0.079y 0.055*
dwave4 0.032y 0.038 0.042 0.013 0.072z 0.033
dwave5 0.043 0.033 0.030 0.059z 0.065z 0.024
dwave6 0.030y 0.023 0.079y 0.022 0.065z 0.019
dwave7 0.035 0.009 0.010 0.031 0.065z 0.067y
dwave8 0.088 0.066y 0.062 0.104 0.126 0.110
dwave9 0.009 -0.003 0.045 0.031 0.045 -0.042
dwave10 0.015 0.045z 0.007 0.008 0.024 0.022
dwave11 0.039 0.010 0.051 0.030 0.068z 0.042
nkids 0.002 -0.001 0.006 0.000 0.009 -0.008
nwage -0.003 -0.004 -0.013z -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
tenured -0.001 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.000 -0.008
lagsaved 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
lagj2pay 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
cons 0.009 0.022 0.006 -0.007 -0.029 0.008
Anderson LM p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 0.654 0.327 0.276 0.164 0.659 0.793
Notes : Signicant at the 1% level
y: Signicant at the 5% level
z: Signicant at the 10% level
Table 5: Vulnerability dynamics, selected quantiles for annual net per capita income
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proximity to the poverty line and 3) a criterion on the basis of which I dene whether
the household is "close" to the poverty line.15 I treat each in turn.
 Poverty line: The poverty line is dened to be at 60% of the median income. This
is the standard approach adopted with reference to the UK.
 The poverty zone: I dene a poverty zone, an interval I dened relative to the
poverty line. Let the proportion of households with incomes below 60% of the
median be q. Since any particular specication of the poverty zone would be an
arbirtrary choice, I take two separate 20% neighbourhoods of this value,
Isym = [q
   0:1; q + 0:1) (8)
and
Iasym = [q
   0:15; q + 0:05): (9)
 Being at the threshold : For each version of the poverty zone I I estimate the
model for both starts in poverty zone case (sipz), where the household was in
Iat the beginning of the panel, and for ever in poverty zone(eipz) case, where
the household is in I for at least one year covered by the panel. The eipz case is
clearly one where there will be a much larger number of households.
I estimate our vulnerability model for each of the two interpretations of the poverty
zone (sipz and eipz cases) using all three income denitions, and using the two interpre-
tations of each poverty zone (symmetric and asymmetric poverty zones, Isym and I

asym):
In Table 6 I present the results of the sipz sub-sample. Signicant vulnerability is now
evident, particularly for symmetric subsamples around the poverty line. Here I obtain
signicant vulnerability for all three income denitions. None of the insurance variables
are not observed to be signicant. In Table 7, I observe the vulnerability dynamics of the
eipz sample. Here there is signicant vulnerability for only the gross income variable.
The number of children and number of wage employable members in household are not
signicant again, though one of the the insurance variables, tenured, is signicant for only
one of the specications estimated. For both sipz and eipz cases it is clear that none of
the "insurances" have any association with changes in consumption.
To summarise our ndings:
15This approach is also undertaken in Bandyopadhyay and Cowell (2007).
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y_gross y_net y_net_ann
Sym Asym Sym Asym Sym Asym
drincome 0.041 0.050 -0.004 -0.004z 0.010z 0.004
dwave2 0.013 0.041 0.027 0.048 0.033 0.054z
dwave3 0.032 0.039 0.039 0.047 0.043 0.050
dwave4 0.004 -0.018 0.011 -0.009 0.018 -0.005
dwave5 0.052 0.084 0.056z 0.089 0.062y 0.094
dwave6 0.003 -0.013 0.010 -0.009 0.014 -0.005
dwave7 0.005 0.034 0.009 0.036 0.015 0.043
dwave8 0.073 0.085 0.078y 0.090 0.084 0.095
dwave9 -0.021 0.014 -0.016 0.020 -0.008 0.026
dwave10 0.037 0.023 0.044 0.028 0.041 0.026
dwave11 0.007 -0.008 0.013 -0.005 0.020 0.002
nkids 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001
nwage -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008
tenured -0.003 0.004 0.000 0.008 -0.001 0.007
lagsaved 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
lagj2pay 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
cons 0.030 0.032 0.023 0.028 0.019 0.024
Anderson LM p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 0.451 0.922 0.138 0.383 0.845 0.641
: Signicant at the 1% level
y: Signicant at the 5% level
z: Signicant at the 10% level
Table 6: Vulnerability model for SIPZ case, symmetric and asymmetric samples
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y_gross y_net y_net_ann
Sym Asym Sym Asym Sym Asym
drincome 0.069 0.055 -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 0.002
dwave2 0.012 0.033 0.093 0.069 0.111 0.070
dwave3 0.054y 0.030 0.029 0.007 0.049z 0.036
dwave4 0.019 0.007 0.017 -0.007 0.047z 0.023
dwave5 0.061y 0.057y 0.046z 0.035 0.056y 0.052y
dwave6 0.027 0.013 0.050z 0.031 0.020 0.025
dwave7 0.012 0.013 0.077z 0.045 0.052 0.063
dwave8 0.064y 0.038 0.066y 0.042 0.074 0.087
dwave9 -0.007 0.010 0.023 0.013 0.033 0.025
dwave10 0.046z 0.031 0.034 -0.013 0.009 -0.001
dwave11 0.009 -0.004 0.036 0.013 0.008 0.003
nkids 0.000 -0.006 -0.007 -0.002 0.001 0.004
nwage -0.004 0.000 -0.006 -0.007 0.005 -0.001
tenured -0.011 -0.011 -0.021 -0.030y -0.017 -0.014
lagsaved 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
lagj2pay 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
cons 0.029 0.043z 0.026 0.046z 0.009 0.027
Anderson LM p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 0.543 0.023 0.356 0.834 0.964 0.872
: Signicant at the 1% level
y: Signicant at the 5% level
z: Signicant at the 10% level
Table 7: Vulnerability model for EIPZ case, symmetric and asymmetric samples
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 Vulnerability is more evident in the case of the (sipz) model, compared to the
(eipz) model. For the former, there is signicant vulnerability for all three income
denitions.
 Of the insurance variables, none of them are signicantly associated with changes
in consumption, except for that of tenured under (eipz) model. It is therefore
clear that while there may be a weak signicant relationship between whether ones
job is tenured or not, the other "liquid assets" have not proven to be signicantly
associated with changes in consumption. It is therefore not clear whether any of
these assets have any "insurance" properties.
 There continues to be wave-specic shocks impinging upon the income stream which
are driving the vulnerability dynamics. In both cases, there is no clear pattern for
which subsample, or income denition they are signicant for. However, for both
cases Waves 5 and 8 are signicant, thereby indicating economy-wide shocks having
had a signicant impact in those specic years.16
What is interesting is that the vulnerability dynamics observed are quite robust to
the choice of the poverty zone denition. It does not matter much whether the poverty
zone was symmetric or asymmetric; the vulnerability dynamics are pretty much the same.
Likewise, results are similar for both sipz and eipz subsamples. It is not surprising that
with a more stricter denition of vulnerability with the case sipz case, that signicant
vulnerability is more evident. What is, however, clear is that there are di¤erent vulner-
ability outcomes depending upon the income denition. The income denition therefore
matters. We nd lesser "vulnerability" with the monthly net income than the monthly
gross income. This suggests that the transfers and benets assist in smoothing the shock
to consumption.
6 Interpretation
I have identied some income quantiles that have a signicant vulnerability co-e¢ cient
using a number of income denitions and smoothing "variables". For the policy maker,
these empirics shed new light on how to provide assistance to the vulnerable. Tradi-
tional poverty alleviating tools used by the welfare policy maker include favourable credit
schemes, incentives for saving and asset building, in addition to benets and transfer
schemes. In the empirics above, the former set of variables are not found to be associated
16All the models estimated in Tables 3 to 7 have been also estimated using the truncated dataset,
the results are identical to those presented in the paper. Scale e¤ects due to household size have also
been taken into account by estimating equivalised incomes; the above models have been estimated using
the equivalised incomes and are in full agreement to the results presented in this paper. All results are
available from the author and have not been presented in the paper for reasons of brevity.
20
with the vulnerable. However, the empirics strongly suggest that transfers and benets
assist the vulnerable (as revealed via the lack of a signicant vulnerability co-e¢ cient
when using net incomes compared to a signicant co-e¢ cient with gross incomes). The
policy packages for assisting the poor, and the vulnerable, are therefore di¤erent.
The welfare-for-work strategy already set out under the UK welfare provision scheme
via the Working Tax Credit (previously the Working Families Tax Credit, similar to the
Earning Individuals Tax Credit system in the United States) is the principle policy tool
used to assist low income households17. These tax credit systems have been found to
have mostly positive outcomes for households (see Blundell (2012), Dahl and Lochner
(2012)). However, the conditions and criteria for selection of households eligible for the
WTC have undergone several changes in recent years, and with some criticism.
At the time of the study of Waves 1-12, the WTC (then WFTC) was means-tested
by income. The di¤erences in the results in signicant vulnerability for gross monthly
and net monthly incomes (i.e. the lack of a signicant vulnerability co-e¢ cient with the
net incomes) is suggestive that the benets and transfers assist vulnerable households in
smoothing consumption. The recent revision in the eligibility criteria however has led
to some distinct changes. The main perceived defect with the revised welfare/benets
system is that the participation tax rates at the lower end of the income distribution
remains high; the e¤ective marginal rate for a WTC recipient today can be over 80%
(Blundell (2012)). UK eligibility for the WTC currently depends upon an hours of work
condition of a minimum 16 hours per week. There is also a family eligibility criterion for
children to be in full-time education or younger. In addition, there is a family net income
eligibility threshold. The WTC, with Income Support and other benets, can result in a
low income earner facing very high e¤ective tax rates. All in all, a household would gain
less from being on a WTC compared to other benets. Therefore in the current set up
of the WTC, the positive e¤ects of benets and transfers revealed in this paper may not
be applicable anymore.
While the results in this paper suggest that a means-tested criteria (on the basis
of income levels) may assist the WTC recipients in smoothing their consumption, the
literature on welfare and benets suggest that higher e¤ective tax rates indicate stronger
redistribution towards low-income families with children Blundell (2012). Clearly, given
the ndings of this paper there is room for further research on the e¤ectiveness of the
current eligibility criteria of the WTC. Also, the empirical ndings in the paper suggest
further possible criteria for identifying households that should qualify (and for those in
receipt of the benet, cease to qualify) for the WTC scheme. The risks which these
households are exposed to are a key to this cut-o¤ point, alongside family income. For
17Other components of the WFTC, such as the Integrated Child Credit (ICC) scheme and an Employ-
ment Tax Credit (ETC) are similar in-work benets that could assist the vulnerable. Wage or earning
subsidies are similar benets, where the subsidy is typically individually based and time limited.
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example, a single parent family18 is less likely to become ineligible for the tax credit over
time than a coupled family. Also, in the face of an income shock, the single parent family
will be less likely to cushion itself via savings (if any) compared to a coupled family with
two (potential) earning members.
Including newer variables as determinants of eligibility of benets and transfers pro-
vides us with more information about those who are likely to be in need of transfers and
benets. This is also likely, therefore, to generate a di¤erent - and potentially larger -
sample of individuals. For example, households under the poverty line revealed to be
vulnerable (note from our estimates above that all quantiles under the poverty line are
not necessarily signicantly vulnerable) may have specic socio-economic characteristics
which render them particularly vulnerable to an income shock. These could be the lack
of assets which could be used as a "rainy day fund", or the absence of another earning
member in the family. Having information on the socio-economic identity of the vulner-
able, particularly those below and just above the poverty line, would allow the policy
maker to make much more informed decisions on policies to assist the vulnerable.
In addition to observing signicant vulnerability with the gross income concept, we
also observe signifcant vulnerability for net (monthly) incomes for some of the quantiles
(namely, (sipz) and (eipz) quantiles). Thus, even after receipt of the benets, some
households remain vulnerable. This points to there being room for further improvement
in how the eligbility criteria are devised for the transfers and benets provided.
Another interesting nding that is worthy of future research is that signicant vulnera-
bility is least evident for the annual net income variable. This points towards vulnerability
in being a short term phenomenon, not observed over the medium-to-long term. Some
preliminary tests undertaken splitting income into its permanent and transitory com-
ponents also show that the transitory income component is associated with signicant
vulnerability and not permanent income (results available from author). This nding
conforms with the extant literature (Hall and Mishkin (1982), Campbell and Deaton
(1989) , Attanasio and Pavoni (2011)) that consumption reacts too little to permanent
income shocks and mostly to transitory income shocks. On the other hand, the textbook
permanent income hypothesis assumes that personal saving is the only mechanism avail-
able to households to smooth shocks to the income stream. The evidence in this paper is
that it does not do so - savings is found to be only occasionally associated with signicant
vulnerability. This is also evident for the preliminary tests undertaken with permanent
and transitory income components. This result is therefore not in agreement with either
the textbook permanent income hypothesis assumption, nor with Deaton (1992) where
self-insurance by borrowing and savings can smooth consumption for a shock to transitory
income.
18Single parent families constitute more than 50% of WFTC recipients.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper I have modelled the vulnerability dynamics of UK households using the
British Household Panel Survey. I was particularly interested in identifying the location
of the vulnerable in the income distribution and observing the e¤ects of "insurances"
or smoothing devises that are available to households. FGLS is used to identify the
vulnerable for which volatile incomes translate into volatile consumption patterns, at
di¤erent parts of the income distribution. I observe that vulnerability is signicantly
associated with economy-wide shocks (captured by year-specic dummies), household
composition and also the nature of insurances to which they may have access to. Most
importantly, di¤erent income concepts have di¤erent stories to tell: expenditure changes
are signicantly associated with income changes when incomeis monthly gross income;
but the vulnerability relationship dened for net income is less evident.
That I do not observe signicant vulnerability regularly with the net income concept,
implies that benets and transfers successfully serve to cushion income shocks, as also
revealed in Bandyopadhyay and Cowell (2007). This is particularly the case when observ-
ing the e¤ects of di¤erent kinds of consumption smoothing mechanisms - in particular
for savings and earnings from second jobs. The results suggest that these smoothing
devices (i.e., savings and earnings from second jobs) may not be su¢ cient to cushion
the e¤ect of income shocks for vulnerable households. The distinctly di¤erent results
(for some income quantiles) using gross and net income concepts clearly point towards
policy successes of the transfer systems currently in place (such as the WFTC). Income
quantiles for which we obtain signicant vulnerability for both gross and net incomes19
are therefore households for whom the transfers and benets have not been successful in
smoothing income shocks, in addition to their own smoothing mechansims (for example,
via household composition). It is these households which require the particular attention
of the welfare system.
While these empirics suggest that "the vulnerable" are di¤erent from "the poor"
(though, one can be both poor and vulnerable), and that vulnerability is most likely
limited to particular parts of the income distribution (i.e., around the poverty line) I would
not interpret vulnerability as simply a "locational device". Identifying the vulnerable
is more than just identifying their level of household income, however income may be
dened; the vulnerable are characterised by the lack of smoothing mechanisms at their
disposal in the face of an income shock. Thus, a description of the "vulnerable household"
is incomplete without a characterisation of their consumption smoothing story. The
denition of "the vulnerable" is therefore subject to country specic conditions, and will
vary across countries, and perhaps between regions within countries. Identifying the
vulnerable and successful welfare targetting is incomplete without identifying the source
19These pertain to households around the poverty line.
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of the vulnerability.
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A Appendix
In this section I discuss the derivation of the estimates of net income, as described in
(Bardasi and Jenkins 2004) The following denitions are provided.
 Total household net income = Total household labour income
+Total household investment
+Total household pension income
+Total household benet income
+Total household transfer income
+Local Taxes.
 Total household labour income is estimated by the following:
Total household labour income = Total household gross labour earnings - Deductions,
where
Total household gross labour earnings = Head of household (hoh): gross earnings
from employment
+Spouse of hoh (where present): gross earnings from employment
+Hoh: gross earnings from self employment
+Spouse of hoh (where present): gross earnings from self employment
+Other gross labour income (earnings of other household members + occasional earn-
ings of head & spouse if they have no main job).
Deductions: Income tax + national insurance contributions + pension contributions
of all household members.
The denition of annual net household income is very similar to that for the current
net household income variable, except for the following exceptions. First, local taxes are
not deducted from income. Second, is related to the income reference period. Annual
net income refer to the 12 months interval up to September 1 of the year of the relevant
interview wave. For example, the wave 6 annual income variables refer to the period
01.09.95 until 31.08.96. Third, annual net income does not include earnings from a
second job (whereas they are included in current net income).
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B Expenditure
Weekly expenditure on food is available in the BHPS as actual expenditure in £ s for
Wave 1, and from Wave 2 onwards is coded over intervals. I convert the coded weekly
expenditure into actual weekly expenditure by using the mid-point of the interval used
for the code. The code provided in the BHPS is given below:
Under £ 10: 1
£ 10-£ 19: 2
£ 20-£ 29: 3
£ 30-£ 39: 4
£ 40-£ 49: 5
£ 50-£ 59: 6
£ 60-£ 79: 7
£ 80-£ 99: 8
£ 100-£ 119: 9
£ 120-£ 139: 10
£ 140-£ 159: 11
£ 160 or over:12
C Insurance variables
Here I describe the insurance variables that have been used in the initial analysis to
determine their individual e¤ects on vulnerability.
 Savings, per week
 Second job earnings, per week
 Loans: Dummy variable, whether the person has a loan or not
 Debts: Dummy variable, whether the person has debt
 Credit: Dummy variable, whether the person has credit cards, store cards.
 Mortgages: Two types of variables: Dummy variable, whether the person has a
mortgage, another variable, value of old mortgage
 House Value: Value of property.
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